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What does rhetorical enquiry bring to the analysis of political discourse that other approaches 
do not? What is it to explore something called ‘rhetoric’ when more elaborate theories of 
discourse are readily available? Rhetorical analysis, I will argue, is attuned to fundamental, 
hermeneutic dimensions of discourse; that is, to its qualities as an activity of assembling and 
re-assembling the meaning of a situation. Where systematic analyses of discourse seek out 
generic patterns that align to wider problematics (such as power relations, social struggles, or 
linguistic communities), rhetorical enquiry takes as its initial object the particular ‘moves’ 
and strategies that generate, innovate and mobilise such discourses and give them singular 
expression. Where ‘discourse’ refers abstractly to the general domain of signs and symbolic 
exchanges, ‘rhetoric’ specifies quite determinate techniques, devices and strategies. 
 
Rhetorical analysis is, of course, compatible with other approaches to discourse and 
contributes productively to their application. But it starts out by exploring discourse at a finer 
scale than many discourse theories, observing the formulations and gestures of concrete 
‘performances’. Here it reveals its origins in the ancient study of public speech and oratory, 
with a focus on practical rather than theoretical knowledge. Rhetoric named and classified the 
many observable, yet flexible, formulations of words and symbols employed in delivering 
verbal arguments on particular occasions. Speakers were instructed to give attention to an 
occasion’s practical purposes, its peculiar conventions, and the character of its audiences, 
each of which was perceived to constrain the proper organisation of discourse.  
 
Today rhetoric applies well beyond the paradigm of individual speakers and live, verbal 
speech to include forms of writing, imagery, and non-live communications, frequently 
consumed by audiences in ways other than attendance at formal occasions. Nonetheless, 
rhetoric’s unique focus on how meaning is figured for practical contexts by selecting known 
expressions and using repeatable techniques gives it enduring value for examining public 
discourse, which remains replete with speakers giving speeches, defending and challenging 
arguments, gesturing allegiances and making verbal announcements. These are certainly not 
the only types or scales of discourse at work in politics, for sure, but I will focus primarily on 
speech events because they constitute vital moments in the active generation and circulation 
of political meaning. 
 
 2 
More than merely adding granularity to more encompassing theories, however, rhetorical 
enquiry also illuminates the ‘risky’ and open-ended nature of discursive action that other 
approaches frequently underplay. Speech interventions – whether verbal, textual, visual or 
some combination – are never guaranteed to work and never permanently fix meaning. That 
is precisely why they rely on certain conventions or known formulations in the first place. 
Political speakers undertake to negotiate the available gaps between convention and 
exception – between, that is, received interpretations and the invention of wholly new 
stances. Occupying that ‘in-between’ space, rhetorical activity recasts convention by 
exposing it, in varying degrees, to a more-or-less subtle ‘play’ so as to provoke new ways of 
thinking, speaking or acting. This, I want to suggest, aligns rhetorical analysis with what John 
Caputo, following Jacques Derrida, has called a ‘radical hermeneutics’, for which making 
‘interpretations’ occurs against an unconditional temporal opening to the future. Because of 
its attention to specific situations, rhetorical enquiry encourages us to ask how – and how 
effectively – public speech negotiates the present and the future. More than other approaches 
to discourse, I claim, rhetorical study foregrounds the ethical risk and responsibility of speech 
as a means to encounter the unknown. 
  
Rhetoric or Discourse Analysis? 
 
Contemporary analysts have a rich variety of approaches to explore and explain the workings 
of public speech. These include nuanced accounts of political ideology, approaches to 
language and discourse drawn from linguistics, media studies, literary theory, and various 
theoretical methods such as ‘poststructuralist’ conceptions of power and identity (see, inter 
alia, Charteris-Black, 2014; Reisigl and Wodak, 2001; Mills, 1997; Howarth, 2000). Such 
approaches offer impressive, encompassing frameworks that highlight conceptual patterns 
and associations, formal and informal textual strategies, and the wider power struggles that 
shape, and are shaped by, public speech and communication. Despite many differences of 
emphasis, all acknowledge that the statements, arguments, and narratives through which 
policies, perspectives, and disagreements communicate are fashioned in symbolic relations 
that enable and constrain the expression of meaning. They share an appreciation of speech as 
a form of ‘discourse’ – a complex system of often implicit, socially-held coordinates 
governing the formulation of meaning. 
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In key respects, these approaches are distinctly modern inventions: they emerge from a 
modern preoccupation with the social domain (rather than sacred texts, or inherited custom 
and tradition alone) as the ultimate horizon of meaning, one that is intrinsically open to 
variation and revision. Nonetheless, they are indebted to the historical tradition of rhetorical 
enquiry dating back to ancient Greece and Rome in as much as they focus on argumentative 
constructs and the mutual interplay of different positions and techniques. For example, the 
analysis of political ideologies explores conceptual constellations supporting argumentative 
traditions (see Freeden, 1996); ‘critical discourse analysis’ draws from linguistics but, in 
some instances, validates rational deliberation as a normative model (see Fairclough and 
Fairclough, 2012); and ‘poststructuralist’ discourse theories frequently highlight metaphors in 
political discourse (see Laclau, 2014). Although these approaches engage, sometimes closely, 
with rhetorical themes and concepts, they focus on exemplary motifs rather than the full 
range of its techniques and devices. Discourse tends to be conceived inclusively, but rather 
abstractly, and defined by generalising specific rhetorical motifs as the pivot on which 
discursive systems balance: for example, enduring ideological contests, linguistic repertoires, 
or struggles over identity.  
 
The rhetorical tradition, however, lacks a single theoretical framework of its own. Its insights 
are not organised around an abstract theory of society but, rather, are culled from a 
multiplicity of observations and customs across more than two thousand years (see Herrick, 
2005). There are numerous traditions supporting these insights, but few offer generic or 
systematic accounts of discourse ‘as such’. Rather, they mirror the shared, but also widely 
divergent, preoccupations of instructors and speakers in elite contexts that, in most instances, 
have long since passed away or transformed: public law courts, participatory democratic 
assemblies, and numerous popular ceremonies (see Pernot, 2015;Vickers, 1988). The 
rhetorical tradition’s approaches to speech are not that of a modern social science – with the 
goals of objectivity, expertise and ‘critique’ (see Felski, 2015) – but, rather, forms of civic 
instruction and its associated ‘practical wisdom’. The reason for knowing how to speak in 
public settings was to pass on, improve and promote effective speech in the polis. Ancient 
rhetoricians were usually instructors, not academic analysts or critics. By consequence, the 
knowledge they imparted presupposed environments where the display of attention to 
communal bonds, and the performed fashioning of self-hood in their light, was self-evidently 
valuable and allocated greater ethical significance than it is today. Also, to speak publicly, 
and to do so effectively, was not just a communal obligation, it was often a strategy of 
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survival in highly competitive contexts. In ancient Greece and Rome, as Habinek (2005: 6-7) 
points out, public oratory staged struggles over the allocation of ‘honour’ and ‘shame’, where 
‘silencing’ one’s opponent could often result in their personal ruin. Rhetorical advice may 
have sometimes invoked grand ideals, but it was acutely sensitive to what worked and what 
didn’t. 
 
Contemporary rhetorical enquiry’s roots in the humanistic observation of speech practices, 
not in social theory, means its practical focus may appear narrower than the scope of the 
modern social sciences – on concrete strategies in very particular historical contexts rather 
than on meaning and symbols generally – and bound up with ethical assumptions that can 
seem very un-modern. These features are sometimes regarded as evidence of the weakness of 
rhetoric as a body of knowledge. The relative absence of theoretical grounding to rhetorical 
enquiry, argued Plato in a criticism that has endured, deprives it of a ‘universal’ philosophical 
or moral basis for critical judgement. Likewise, its assumed ethical orientation is often 
perceived as flimsy, highly variable and therefore open to cynical abuse. Yet this flexibility is 
also a strength. There is scope in rhetorical enquiry for a universalising approach to argument 
(see Perelman and Olbrechts Tyteca, 1969) and for critical social enquiry (see Mckerrow, 
1989). Tellingly, instructors of speech and communication, speech writers, and politicians 
still look to the practical knowledge of rhetoric as a body of examples and insights – rather 
than to complex and specialist discourse theories – precisely because of this concrete, mobile 
and civically-attuned character. 
 
We might well ask, then, what rhetorical enquiry brings to the study of public speech given 
these differences and specificities. Without roots in social theory, is it more than just a 
summary of speaking habits for different occasions? What deeper input, if any, can it 
provide? Below I want to claim that attention to rhetoric does indeed offer valuable resources 
for studying political behaviour, which can complement more encompassing theories of 
discourse. But it also provides a distinct perspective that contrasts with such theories’ 
tendency to generalise around certain themes. That, however, requires we appreciate 
rhetorical enquiry has a distinct hermeneutic focus, namely the ‘moves’ that assemble and 





Public speech and communication are rarely included under the lofty label ‘hermeneutics’. 
More often than not, such discourse is associated with partisan bickering, manoeuvring for 
positions of personal or party advantage, even ideological posturing – in short, contests for 
power and influence. Hermeneutics, by contrast, explores practices of textual interpretation 
and, as a branch of philosophy, is associated with weighty and rigorous enquiries into law, 
theology or aesthetics, where the question is how to understand the meaning of specific 
statements against a backdrop of received intellectual and textual traditions (see Grondin, 
1994). Public discourse, by contrast, is – not unreasonably – perceived as the immediate flux 
of events, superficial opinions and disagreements, not statements of enduring significance to 
be closely deciphered. Yet such discourse involves making interpretations, too, and not all 
are reducible to tactical power contests. Public speech encompasses political disputation and 
campaigning but also diplomatic speech, formal statements and press encounters, memorial 
discourse and eulogies, confessional revelations, critical interrogations in public committees, 
legal clarifications and, increasingly, informal observations and interventions on social 
media. These draw upon traditions of thought, styles of address, and apply concepts and 
arguments, as well as reinvest ideas with practical or moral significance and are irreducible 
simply to one type of speech alone.  
 
Hermeneutics originally concerned how meaning is translated from one context to another, 
often where inherited truths and authorities must be brought to bear on new circumstances 
and problems. As a theory of meaning, it makes explicit the choices and conventions by 
which, in established fields of interpretation, we understand (or not) claims to ‘truth’ about 
the world. Zimmerman (2015: 10-15) usefully identifies three guiding principles in 
hermeneutic reflection: first, that human subjects are deeply bound up with their social and 
material worlds, not separate ‘minds’ sealed off from their environments. We are inescapably 
immersed in interpretive traditions and conventions that mediate our experiences and assign 
them meaning and value. Second, our capacity to reason and determine truth is therefore 
never disengaged but always projected by way of the meanings we inherit that shape our 
practical encounters. Truth is not a ‘discovery’ about things ‘out there’ but an event that 
inhabits us and projects us forward. And third, we find and transmit this truth primarily by 
way of language, which, via vocabularies and concepts, metaphors and symbols, insert our 
reception of the unfamiliar into established ‘horizons’ of meaning. For the hermeneutic 
philosopher Hans-Georg Gadamer, famously, reaching understanding is properly grasped not 
as the achievement of accurate description but as an ongoing ‘conversation’, or dialogue, 
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whereby we adjust and expand our conceptual and aesthetic horizons to encompass new 
perspectives (see Gadamer, 1989: 385-91). 
 
Public speech might well be conceived as part of this ongoing interpretive conversation, even 
if hermeneutic philosophers have tended to set it apart. What is distinctive, however, is the 
apparent primacy of an immediate situation. Public debates and arguments are preoccupied 
less with ‘deep’ historical or universal meanings (as would be scholars of jurisprudence or art 
historians, for example) but with the practical significance of their pronouncements in the 
short run. For critics, that is precisely the problem: politicians compete to determine the 
course of events by purposefully ‘stretching’ truths and over- or understating problems to 
shape the situation in ways that, ultimately, favour their own quests for power – accusations 
that are currently made around, for instance, climate change, security threats, or the 
advantages of major policy changes such as Brexit.  
 
Often, then, public discourse seems less a hermeneutical conversation than a crude struggle 
for attention or domination. Conflicts of interpretation and a tendency to mutual disruption, 
rather than dialogue, are frequent – as President Trump’s abundant stream of Tweets readily 
demonstrate. Yet, even if we acknowledge the public realm as a locus of competition, the 
interpretations at work are rarely reducible to some passing effervescence. Rather, they seek 
an enduring impact by orienting themselves towards a situation in the present, utilising what 
Aristotle (2019: 6) called the ‘possible means of persuasion’ to retrieve opportunities for the 
future and thereby to generate coalitions of interests and partial forms of consensus as 
platforms for policy. Rhetoric’s focus is therefore not on the superficial or ephemeral aspects 
of discourse (as is often decried) so much as on how meaning is figured in any instance to 
define a situation and determine its unfolding consequences.  
 
My suggestion here, then, is that the focus of rhetorical enquiry is on discourse as a practice 
of meaning-making as it relates to a prevailing situation that both constrains and motivates 
speech. This lends it a quite distinct hermeneutical orientation. The ‘situation’, as rhetoric 
scholar Lloyd Bitzer (1968) put it, typically comprises a speaker, audience (or set of 
audiences), and motivating problem (or ‘exigence’) that, together, impose conditions on how 
meaning is effectively constructed (see Martin, 2015). I will return to the question of 
temporality shortly but, for now, we can already see how the situatedness of rhetoric 
underscores certain hermeneutical particularities. The interpretive process here involves 
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orienting audiences towards an identified problem or circumstance, and not exclusively to a 
fixed tradition of ideas or doctrine. The latter may certainly be a resource (and hence also a 
constraint) for speakers but political speech itself involves reformulating such resources anew 
so that they respond to the present context. Rhetorical enquiry’s attention is on the strategies 
made in this response.  The many and varied choices of argument, genres of address and 
linguistic styles in rhetoric are interpretative ‘moves’ that foreground problematic aspects of 
the situation, either in part or in general (for example as a crisis, or a failure of policy or 
leadership) – thereby rendering them meaningful and so amenable to practical resolution (see 
Finlayson, 2006). For example, in the UK’s 2019 general election, Conservative leader Boris 
Johnson’s oft-repeated campaign phrase ‘Let’s Get Brexit Done’ addressed the electorate 
with a simple and clear invitation to resolve a deadlock (Perrigo, 2019). What had been an 
entrenched and endlessly divisive policy disaster was successfully refigured as a discrete 
practical hurdle that merely required sufficiently motivated will-power to overcome.  
 
Of course, electoral campaigning lends itself to pithy slogans because it involves a rhetoric 
aimed at compelling a judgement on the part of the audience. But other types of rhetoric are 
free of this overt compulsion. Epideictic (or ‘display’) speech – such as US Presidential 
inaugurals, memorial orations or award-giving events – comprise ritual occasions that grant 
speakers platforms to indulge praise or direct blame, define current problems, and selectively 
invoke common feelings with audiences who, largely, remain passive (Condit, 1985). 
Swedish environmental activist Greta Thunberg’s recent widely publicised speeches, for 
example, employ an epideictic form of moral accusation regarding the inescapable urgency of 
climate change (see Milman, 2019). Here the display of anger and frustration is itself the 
message – rather than any new information or insight. Such declamations are now widely 
consumed and recirculated on social media – from Tweeting to blogging, podcasting and 
broadcasts on YouTube: digital platforms designed for transmitting personalised responses to 
situations with observations, characterisations, and emotive expressions that invite 
‘spontaneous’ acclaim from audiences rather than critical judgement.  
 
Understood hermeneutically, then, a rhetorical approach to discourse focuses on 
interpretative choices formulated within the constraining horizon of a prevailing 
circumstance. Unlike the traditional concerns of philosophical hermeneutics, however, public 
speech rarely involves the achievement of ‘shared understanding’, though it may aspire to. If 
it does, such understanding remains provisional, unevenly distributed, and vulnerable to 
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disagreement. Unlike expert legal or theological conversations, public disputes and 
commentary unfold on the assumption that full moral agreement is unlikely, or at least 
precarious. Political audiences are permanently ready to disagree and disrupt the prospect of 
consensus, positioning themselves as critics with alternative interpretations and offering 
contrasting stances. Of course, democratic debate typically occurs within the parameters of a 
general agreement on how to disagree (e.g. within the terms of the law, convention, taste and 
so on), although even that is open to challenge and variation. The ultimate authority in formal 
politics, however, tends to be the procedural formation of numerical majorities, not a 
substantial consensus. That lends political speech, in particular, the positional and conflictual 
character that makes it distinctive since interpretations retain a partisan nature that can seem 
deliberately performed for the sake of affirming one side rather than aimed at achieving 
moral understanding.  
 
For these reasons, we might characterise a hermeneutics of public speech as one of action 
rather than text. Although speech is usually expressed in the form of spoken or written text, 
and arguments draw upon known concepts and doctrines, the overtly positional nature of 
political dispute means that, in rhetoric, we are dealing not with the strict application of 
language alone but, rather, the framing of the space of argument itself. Rhetorical speech 
encourages audiences to perceive their situations from distinct standpoints, thereby disposing 
them favourably or unfavourably to positions (regarding policy outcomes, moral opinions, 
events or leaders) that may or may not be announced directly. Making an interpretation of 
that kind entails judging where to place emphasis, how to characterise an issue, emphasise 
certain features over others, invoke doubt or certainty, and so on – all of which involves 
combining manoeuvres that purposively reorder and subtly transform their objects, rather 
than simply describing facts or setting out concepts. ‘Interpretation’ here entails not merely 
offering a narrative but, rather, disposing audiences towards a given meaning of the situation. 
Rhetoric’s interpretive work, we might say, involves dynamic action to shape an audience’s 
confidence about the stance on offer, not always to demonstrate conceptual validity or 
analytical integrity. That, of course, is why Plato railed against rhetoric since, to him, it 
appeared more a way to play with feelings and manipulate audience predispositions than to 
do rigorous philosophy, which reasoned from principles deemed ‘eternal’. For others, such as 
Machiavelli, rhetoric’s quality as a form of doing politics was precisely what suited it to the 
public realm (see Fontana, 2009). Far from signalling an offense against the static order of 
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If public speech is hermeneutically distinctive in its addressing a practical circumstance, 
nonetheless it is not exhausted by its situational context, even if rhetorical analysis typically 
starts from there. A situation is only ever a relatively closed context, unlike a game where 
various ‘moves’ are contained within a fixed set of rules that enable degrees of precise 
calculation. Public and political situations, however, are multifaceted and shifting, forever 
opening up and closing opportunities for speech, and rarely sealed off from wider, exterior 
circumstances. Indeed, discourse can itself dramatically alter its own context as certain 
arguments, ideas, images or vocabularies take hold. By consequence, public speech retains an 
underlying sense of risk, of acting in precarious conditions where interventions are just as 
likely to succeed, fail, or have an unforeseen, possibly even detrimental impact. Rhetoric 
therefore operates not just in time but also as a means to reorganize time, daring to reorder it 
so as to make situations amenable to certain kinds of action. In the next section I will argue 
that these considerations align rhetoric with what John Caputo calls a ‘radical hermeneutics’ 
receptive to the negotiation of conventional interpretations and those that open up to an 
incalculable future. But first, what does it mean to say that speech has a temporal character? 
 
Although we tend to think of speaking as happening in the context of time, or addressing the 
‘issues of the time’, it is also a way to shape time by resetting agendas, foregrounding some 
opportunities over others, or moving on from past legacies. As well as a response to a 
situation, speech undertakes to transform it, or more precisely, to retrieve possibilities from it 
that, left unsaid, may otherwise go unrealised. To understand this dimension, we need to 
think about the relation of language to time, setting aside the commonplace view of speaking 
as contained within ‘objective’ or ‘linear’ time. This is where Derrida’s philosophy of 
deconstruction is instructive.  
 
For Derrida (here following Heidegger), we tend to think of time in terms of ‘the present’ – 
that is, as an immediate ‘living’ moment that, at any time, is directly there before us. Past and 
future are, in that respect, merely preceding or superseding presents in an infinite linear 
series. But, Derrida argues, it is impossible to delineate this temporal present without 
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spatially distinguishing it from past and future (or ‘non-present’) moments. Past and future 
are never wholly exterior to the present but, rather, non-presences contained within it: there is 
no pure ‘now’, no founding ‘origin’ or a self-same moment that is not marked by 
differentiation from before or after (see Derrida, 2011). Our measure of time is not therefore 
strictly neutral or objective but dependent on a ‘spatial’ inscription that records and thereby 
inflects it with rhythm, pace, qualities of duration or interruption that make the present appear 
by way of what is absent. Rather than a neutral universal backdrop to all events, time is 
experienced in particular ways through processes – both social and technological – that 
inscribe it: memorials, recordings, writings, photographs and so on. Deconstruction 
underscores the inescapable impurity of time and all other motifs of self-presence, 
highlighting how we remain entangled in, and responsible to, legacies of pasts that we can 
neither fully retrieve nor simply relinquish (see Dooley and Kavanagh, 2007). 
 
If the temporal present is distinguished only by way of marks (such as performed rituals, 
graphic writing, or other kinds of marks) that effectively ‘archive’ the moment then, by 
definition, those marks exceed their original enunciation and expose its meaning in the 
present to potential alteration: this risk, or exposure to modification, is not external, or 
accidental, but the very condition of any idea being communicable (Derrida, 1988: 15). 
Symbols can be received and consumed long after the death of the author and by 
readers/listeners who are not its original recipients. That is why writing, and other such 
technologies, are frequently regarded with disdain by western philosophy – because they 
betray the conceit that meaning arises directly in a pure ‘self-presence’ such that subsequent 
repetition or reproduction is a secondary distortion of an original ‘living’ thought. Derrida’s 
project was precisely the effort to demonstrate that there is never an original presence without 
language, and so no ‘ideal’ meaning that is not also subject to the effects of delay, deferral 
and hence ‘distortion’ (or ‘dissemination’) by time. All expression is internally ‘haunted’ by 
this exposure to a generic otherness (or alterity) that violates the integrity of identity. To 
communicate is to engage in a curious interplay of presence and absence that instantiates this 
intrinsic tension: foregrounding what appears to be an original presence (such as a thought, 
feeling, or an event) but simultaneously distancing us from it by also making it available for 
repetition. Philosophers have tried to erase the purported ‘corruption’ of identity through 
writing so as to found meaning on a self-identical utterance, memory, or event exempt from 
the play of signification – in what Derrida refers to as the ‘metaphysics of presence’, 
typically revealed in binary thinking that asserts a violent hierarchy between pure and impure 
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(or original and ‘supplemental’) moments. But deconstruction insists that all self-presence is 
subject to what he calls ‘archi-writing’ – the delay and differentiation by marks – rendering 
any original temporal foundation desirable yet ultimately irretrievable (Derrida, 2011: 73).  
 
Rhetoric shares profoundly in this practice of archi-writing. Whether written or spoken (and 
public speech typically is both) it seeks to say something about a singular ‘now’ by way of 
marks that nonetheless surpass the situation and render its meaning available to re-
interpretation at other, later moments. There is, consequently, no situational context that can 
fully or unequivocally fix the meaning of any utterance or the object it describes – or, as 
Derrida says, ‘a context is always open’ (Derrida and Ferraris, 2001: 20. See also Derrida, 
1988: 18). Rather than a linear series of discrete, unfolding presents in and about which 
speakers speak, time (and consequently meaning) is much less stable or coherent. Speech 
does not simply respond externally to the times but, rather, intervenes so as to reorder time 
itself. It punctuates time in order to confirm, contest or reset priorities, to close off alternative 
paths of thought and action, to make present or amplify certain aspects of a situation, to 
indicate urgent threats and thereby set new expectations. Speakers re-inscribe time by altering 
the frame, insisting on particular priorities, evoking imagery, erasing or minimising 
alternatives so as to make some issues ‘urgent’ and exhort us not to ‘waste time’. In UK 
politics, for example, citizens are routinely reminded by politicians at elections that they have 
one ‘last chance to save the NHS’, or that referendums instantiate some moment of ‘choice 
for a generation’. 
 
Time in Derrida’s work is ‘aporetic’. The living present is always ‘non-contemporaneous’ 
with itself (Derrida, 1994: xix); which is to say, it is fractured and dis-adjusted. Or, as he 
frequently characterises it, following Shakespeare’s Hamlet: ‘time is out of joint’. From this 
we can further argue that there are, at any instance, multiple overlapping temporalities, 
figured by numerous forms of inscription: the rhythms of work, leisure, economy, the media, 
the environment, personal and social health, politics and so on. These are temporal frames – 
or what Wood (2007) calls ‘economies of time’ – that enclose certain transformations (such 
as labour and wealth creation, aging, shifting values) inside repeating processes; but they 
never cohere spontaneously under one uniform or harmonious logic. Indeed, the aporetic 
character of time is precisely the condition in which different rhythms, durations, scales and 
paces in society collide and mutually disfigure each other. What we have called the rhetorical 
situation may be better understood not as a determining context all contained in one temporal 
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moment or sequence, as Bitzer would have us think, but an ‘overdetermined’ context in 
which apparent temporal coherence breaks down and a dramatic uncertainty is introduced. 
 
To think of speech as an intervention to shape time brings to the fore its rhetorical character. 
Aristotle himself famously divided rhetoric into three ‘kinds’ differentiated broadly by their 
relation to time: judicial speech dealt with the past, deliberative speech dealt with the future, 
and epideictic speech dealt with the present (2019: 12-13). Each, accordingly, prioritised 
different persuasive ends (e.g. deciding justice/injustice, expedience, and allocating 
praise/blame, respectively). These distinctions helped classify common ways that rhetorical 
interventions manage the aporia of time by rendering its interruption meaningful. We can 
therefore understand contemporary speech interventions as efforts, in Derrida’s terms, to re-
mark time by articulating various devices and conventions. 
 
For example, public speech is frequently performed in specific institutional settings set apart 
from a wider, ongoing situation, in order to comment on that situation. In assemblies, town 
halls, conference chambers, digital streams and so on, speakers are given a special platform 
whose local time economy differs from the events about which they talk: a parliamentary 
session, an evening TV interview, an annual ceremony, a press call, or a statement at a public 
event. Such settings permit speakers to suspend themselves from the dynamics of the 
situation with which they are concerned. That way, their ‘voices’ appear as commentaries and 
observations that coincide with what they think, permitting them to punctuate the time as if 
from the outside. In so doing, of course, they operate within conventions that are not always 
visible, appearing as more-or-less ‘spontaneous’ interventions secure in their own presence. 
The immediate conditions of speaking nonetheless recede into the background as 
personalised voices come to the fore: speakers insert themselves within localised economies 
of time such as parliamentary debates (see Palonen, 2019), after-dinner slots, media cycles, or 
conference performances to confer degrees of duration, intimacy, impact and so on that 
permit them, momentarily, to interrupt other economies of time and to figure a sense of 
urgency. These conditions enable ways of delivering untimely interventions to remark time, 
displaying what Derrida (2002: 92) calls ‘an untimeliness that comes on time’. 
 
Rhetorical strategies are also comprised of linguistic and argumentative techniques that entail 
a temporal play of presence and absence. In that respect, speech is a way of ‘playing for 
time’. Speeches are structured temporal economies that contain symbolic transformations in a 
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particular duration and sequence, delaying and deferring their insights by adapting them to a 
‘genre’ of communicating that arranges them according to certain pattern: as direct assertions 
(the prepared comments made ‘in passing’ to the media), via observations in dialogue with 
the situation from which they speak (comments while touring factories or high streets, with 
ordinary people as a natural audience), or according to a more articulated set of insights, 
observations, and judgements given a length of time for elaboration (the political interview or 
set-piece speech). Different genres allow for alternative ways of organising the duration and 
intensity of speaking, the speed at which a point will be made and the ability to employ 
devices (such as repetition, aphorisms, or rhetorical questions that invite their own answer) as 
well as evade criticism.  
 
In all these techniques, speakers not only articulate time through emphasis, delay and 
repetition; they also work on the audience’s memory. Rhetorical history provides archives of 
say-able and repeatable phrases. Public speaking re-assembles our memory of historic events, 
established ideas, or attitudinal dispositions by way of recollection in phrases, 
commonplaces, analogies and other references that prompt and refashion memory. For 
example, Trump’s call to ‘Make America Great Again’ recycled a previously employed 
phrase (used by Ronald Reagan in 1980) but also invoked an established nostalgia for 
American exceptionalism (see Jouet, 2017). The deployment of old and new words, 
catchphrases and popular cultural references, capture, in a passing instant, echoes of earlier 
presences. Rhetorical invention rarely involves saying anything utterly novel but, rather, the 
creative repetition and reworking of known argumentative stances, stories, and phrases that 
refresh a certain position that then (it is hoped) will be repeated and recirculated by the press 
and wider audiences. That way, we are provoked into responding to an argument by 
recollecting through its traces something we remember. Audiences are surprisingly willing to 
tolerate repetition and cliché in public speeches, particularly when speech is part of a 
recognised ritual. But even non-ritual speech assembles its components from familiar 
arrangements and utilises formal devices (such as schemes of repetition or three-part phrases) 
whose structure an audience will recollect. Rhetoric thus describes a practice of ‘re-
membering’ – putting the parts together again in a similar but different form – so as to 
condense the familiar and the novel in a seamless fashion, as if one’s insights sprang 
effortlessly from common knowledge itself. That way, the fracturing of time is diminished by 
a momentary glimpse of resurgent presence. It is no surprise, then, that certain speech 
moments – presidential inaugurals, war time orations, sermonic declarations – are frequently 
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looked upon with an intense nostalgia, casting them as culminating interventions that 
uniquely ‘capture’ their times. 
 
The Promise of Speech  
 
What does it mean for a hermeneutics of public speech that rhetoric is both timely and 
untimely? I want to argue – following Derrida’s lead and by way of John Caputo’s radical 
hermeneutics – that we conceive speech as a practice of ‘negotiating’ the conventional and 
the novel. That is to say, a hermeneutics of public speech invites us to grasp its interpretive 
force in terms of its combined calculation of context and its ethical opening to an incalculable 
future. Rhetoric is neither purely techniques to manage the immediacy of a situation nor, 
alternatively, the effort to say something entirely new or different, but an ethical and political 
practice conjoining the one to the other. The accent here is not on the past or the present but, 
rather, the future; not a future understood as a set of predictable circumstances, but the future 
as such. It is because this future is intrinsically unknowable that decisions have to be made 
and interpretations ventured. The ethics here are minimal, concerned not with meeting 
explicit virtuous ends (such as moral agreement or the ‘good’ of the community) but, rather, 
an implicit responsibility to prepare for what cannot be known. 
 
John Caputo argues that the temporal instability of meaning stressed by Derrida invites a 
distinctly ‘postmodern’ approach to hermeneutics (see Caputo, 2018; 1987). Making 
interpretations, on this account, is always an encounter with the alterity of the future; what we 
retrieve from interpretative traditions and conventions will lack purity because they face new 
and different circumstances. There is no foundation or original truth that is not, in its being 
recalled under new conditions, exposed to alteration or even corruption. To repeat (an insight, 
a phrase, an argument, etc) is to ‘repeat forwards’, rather than backwards, since every new 
context will figure conventions anew, if only subtly so. Without absolute anchoring to the 
past, interpretation enacts a negotiation between convention and the unknown future: ‘An 
interpretation happens in the space between the regular and the irregular, the commensurable 
and the incommensurable, the normalized and the exceptional, the centre and the margins, the 
same and the other’ (2018: 139. Italics in original).  
 
Interpretation, on this account, is always a process of negotiation, of making meaning by 
opening up to the ‘undecidability’ of the future – its potential to be otherwise or what Derrida 
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calls ‘the coming of the other’ – yet without entirely surrendering to it (see Derrida, 2002: 16-
17). In the face of social and political uncertainties and our inevitable lack of preparation for 
whatever situations may arrive, we must calculate with the argumentative and moral 
resources we have. The recent arrival and spread of the Corona virus around the world, for 
example, saw a revival among political leaders of the language of ‘war’, command, technical 
expertise and collective mobilisation. Yet we also need to discover (or, as rhetoricians put it, 
‘invent’) new arguments, altering – sometimes mildly, sometimes radically – the way we 
speak and argue. Thus the response to the virus also renewed a language of national 
solidarity, state intervention, and public service that, for some leaders, was hard to square 
with their former faith in markets and self-reliance.   
 
Whereas conventional hermeneutics conceives interpretation largely as a process of retrieval 
– drawing upon (and so repeating faithfully) traditions of understanding to confront the new – 
Caputo’s radical hermeneutics underscores how the very prospect of the new distorts or 
transforms inherited traditions from within, altering our sense of being. Derrida’s project is 
neither to refuse the other nor is it, as some have misunderstood, to open up entirely to it. 
Rather, we are obliged to negotiate inherited truths, positions and phrases in light of what 
disrupts and fractures their self-evidence. The difference with traditional hermeneutics here is 
perhaps slight but nonetheless significant. Whereas Gadamer views interpretation from the 
perspective of the tradition that confronts and eventually reconciles itself to a new 
understanding, Derrida views it from the perspective of the new that persistently haunts and 
disrupts tradition.  
 
As Caputo underlines, this small switch in emphasis – from ‘pious interpretation’ to ‘poetic 
impiety’ – nonetheless has important consequences (Caputo, 2018: 140). Assembling 
meaning rhetorically is never merely the reassertion of cultural norms in new contexts but an 
active intervention, a process of exposing established positions to degrees of disorder and 
renewal. That is why Caputo insists on interpretation as a risky process, one that cannot ever 
fully control a situation so much as participate in the destabilisation it brings to convention 
such that new and different situations might emerge as a consequence. Thus Trump’s ‘Make 
America Great Again’ was more than mere nostalgia; it gambled on refiguring 
exceptionalism as a requirement to withdraw from global leadership or progressive goals, not 
expand them. Public speech, we might say, intervenes by negotiating the conventional and 
the irregular, with the risk that such intervention will fail, or that the events will turn out 
 16 
differently because of the intervention, or that it will be utterly ineffectual. The risk of 
rhetoric lies, therefore, in its effort to intervene – not in its faithful ‘relaying the facts’ or 
repeating the accepted convention. In this, speakers must calculate in the context of the 
incalculable.  
 
All ‘language acts’, claims Derrida (1995: 384), ‘entail a certain structure of the promise’. A 
promise is a commitment to something in the future; but it is a commitment that cannot ever 
be guaranteed. If a promised act was certain, then it would not be a promise. Promises only 
work because they can fail, be betrayed, or forgotten. The promise has exemplary status for 
Derrida because, in its affirmation to the other (person, or even oneself) of something to 
come, it instantiates the negotiation of a future. When that future comes, its trace then holds 
us to a past commitment, in what Derrida (2002: 50) describes as a ‘fabulous retroactivity’. 
All speech involves this retroactive structure because, by necessity, its traces transmit across 
time. As we have seen, such traces are precisely what rhetorical enquiry explores: styles and 
schemes of argument that carry meaning beyond the moment of its enunciation, conjoining us 
with something of the past in our new circumstances.  
 
Now, if all speech and writing contain this ‘promissory’ quality (i.e. it can all be repeated at a 
later date), public speech routinely makes an explicit, thematic point of it: think of Martin 
Luther King Jr’s reference to the ‘promissory note’ in his 1963 speech in Washington DC. 
Political campaigns and debates, party manifestos, public ceremonies, and so on, involve 
modes of speaking that, in various ways, explicitly commit speakers (and, by implication, 
their audiences) to a future that they cannot actually guarantee. Indeed, it is because they 
cannot guarantee the promise will be kept that the formulation of speech carries such force; 
the words momentarily incarnate the gesture they enact, and often come to be the tangible 
token of the sentiment (hence even Churchill’s ‘we will fight them on the beaches’ retains its 
force as the trace of a moment most people cannot recall). Rhetoric is filled with such tokens 
to help usher in the future. It is here that the negotiation between the calculable and the 
incalculable takes place. Promises are always qualified, either explicitly or implicitly: ‘vote 
for me and I give you my word to make things better’, ‘Accept this reasoning and you’ll see 
the consequences of my opponent’s error’, ‘Have faith and you’ll get the reward’, and so on. 
Inevitably, the promise is entangled in a calculation by being delivered in a particular way to 
and for particular audiences.  
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This entanglement of the calculable and incalculable is partly why political speech can be so 
disappointing and infuriating – the immediate calculation (for advantage, or even mere 
caution) is sometimes all too visible and the promise seems half-hearted or, alternatively, 
promises accumulate wildly and fail to be credible and, eventually, are reneged upon. 
Democratic politics, which enable substantial opportunity for speaking and hearing speech, 
are likely to encourage calculations that allow parties and politicians either to gamble on 
hyperbolically overstating their commitments to change or, alternatively, to avoid risks by 
remaining dully pragmatic and short-termist. In such conditions, it is not surprising to find 
the language of politics filled with evaluative terms that indicate the centrality and 
precariousness of promising to its discourse: ‘trust’, ‘responsibility’, ‘betrayal’, ‘deception’ 
and so forth.  
 
But the promise of speech is not strictly about actual futures but about the future as such (or 
what Derrida calls the ‘absolute future’). That is, it concerns the future as an unknowable 
dimension of the present, a future that is constantly coming. Overt promises and 
commitments play on the prospect of futures that can be concretely described, anticipated and 
realised, that is, made genuinely present. But the promise that inheres in speech (whether or 
not presented as an overt promise, a threat, or even as a refusal to promise) is not the 
indication of some state of affairs whose realisation will or not become fully present. In itself 
speaking enacts a responsibility – that is, a ‘response’-iveness – to the very otherness of the 
situation, to welcome it in one form or another (if only as an utter disaster or 
disappointment). Trump’s rhetoric, for example, makes a regular commitment to the idea of 
contemporary America being in perilous decline, or what in his Inaugural he dubbed 
‘American carnage’ (Trump, 2017). How one chooses one’s words, then, involves a choice 
about how to take up the promise that speaking affirms simply as language. What matters 
here is not only the character of the outcomes that one promises (however realistic or 
idealistic) but, as an interpretive act, how any enunciation sustains (or not) an opening to the 
future – for example, by affirming or refusing it, offering some qualified or deferred 
response, providing a new vocabulary or even by avoiding classifying it rigidly in advance 
(see Derrida, 1989: 84-86). A negotiation is an ethical commitment to the future but one that 
is rhetorically formulated – for instance, as a threat, danger, tragedy, or as an opportunity, 




It is all too easy to dismiss politicians and public speakers for being ‘all talk’ yet such 
resignation only ever returns us to an urgent desire for more promises since, for all our 
righteous indignation at the failings of public discourse, we cannot avoid facing an unknown 
future. Rather than dismissing speech as such or, alternatively, seeking to replace it with the 
expert or bureaucratic management of policy, we might choose to reflect on how rhetorical 
negotiation operates in any instance. A hermeneutics of public speech alerts us to the way 





What, then, is the peculiar advantage of rhetorical enquiry? I have argued that its 
distinctiveness over other approaches to discourse lies in a hermeneutical attention to the 
concrete ways public speech practically assembles meaning. There are two key aspects to 
this. 
 
First, the focus is on speech as a response to a particular situation. The situation that gives 
rise to speech also conditions what can be said and how. Rhetorical enquiry explore the ways 
this unfolding, proximate context is addressed (or interpreted) and so it invites appreciation 
of the singularity of the moment that gives any discourse its distinctive weight and force. Of 
course, wider questions can and should be asked about the social conditions of rhetoric and 
the struggles and power relations they articulate. But rhetorical enquiry’s attention to this 
singularity permits us to regard such conditions, struggles and relations as entailing 
precarious choices open to inflection and strategic revision. 
 
Second, rhetorical analysis is attuned to its situation as an opening to the future. Speakers are 
always ‘doing things with words’ because situations are never closed-off contexts. Rather, as 
I have tried to argue by reference to Derrida and Caputo, they are evolving conjunctures of 
fractured temporality. We speak so as to shape situations, not merely to describe them. 
Speakers may frequently be calculating, but they undertake varying degrees of risk in 
venturing interpretations, deploying temporal qualities of delay and distance to negotiate an 
incalculable future. That is not to say, of course, this is always done effectively or 
responsibly. But unlike discourse theories that invest greatly in the idea of critique (that is, in 
‘revealing’ the contingency and partiality of speech and thought), rhetoric’s hermeneutics is 
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not one of suspicion but, rather, action. It invites us to ask the ethical question of how and 
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